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comparatively alongside other explanations, most notably rational choice. This lack of comparative study
implies that prior research may be committing Type I errors—confirming aspiration-level decision making
when it is not actually occurring. This paper contributes to behavioral theory in two specific ways. First,
we show that several foundational studies purporting to provide empirical support for aspiration-level
decision making may actually represent maximizing behavior. To consider this potential, we simulate a
sample of subjectively rational agents who choose strategies by maximizing expectations. We show that
it is possible and highly probable to diagnose satisficing when agents are, in fact, maximizing. Second, we
develop and implement recommendations for comparative testing to demonstrate reliability. Analysis
shows that the recommendations are effective at reducing Type I and II errors for both behavioral theory
and rational choice. This paper is meant to inspire the design of future studies on aspirations and, indeed,
all studies of organizational change.
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RATIONALIZING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Abstract
Behavioral Theory explains that organizational change is prompted by performance relative to a
firm-specific aspiration. While this explanation has been empirically confirmed, it has not been
tested comparatively alongside other explanations, most notably rational choice. This lack of
comparative study implies that prior research may be committing Type I errors – confirming
aspiration-level decision-making when it is not actually occurring. The paper contributes to
behavioral theory in two specific ways. First, it is shown that several foundational studies
purporting to provide empirical support for aspiration level decision-making may actually
represent maximizing behavior. To consider this potential, a sample of subjectively rational
agents is simulated who choose strategies by maximizing expectations. It is shown that they can
be perceived as satisficing, even when aspirations are absent from the data. Second,
recommendations for comparative testing are developed and implemented to demonstrate their
reliability. Analysis of simulated data shows the recommendations are effective at reducing Type
I and Type II errors for both behavioral theory and rational choice. The paper has strong
implications for the design of future studies on aspirations, and indeed, all studies of
organizational change.

1. Introduction
It has been frequently argued that managers satisfice in their decision-making. In contrast to
most models of rational choice where the best alternative is selected, Cyert and March (1992:
134) emphasize that their theory of organizational decision-making assumes:
… an approximate sequential consideration of alternatives. The
first satisfactory alternative evoked is accepted . . .
where firm-specific performance aspirations determine what is “satisfactory”. This view suggests
firms use aspirations to dictate change behavior, and a growing body of empirical work claims to
find evidence of this theory. However, the vast majority of confirmations fail to consider
alternative explanations. The danger, of course, is Type I error, also known as a false positive,
which occurs when a theory is confirmed yet is not true.1 To avoid this grave danger, the method
of multiple working hypotheses is advocated, where theories are tested comparatively.

1

The rate of Type I error is usually denoted by the Greek letter α, and usually equals the significance level of a test.

2

RATIONALIZING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Comparative testing refers to the systematic consideration of alternative explanations to a
phenomena, as Kuhn (1970: 146) emphasizes: “. . . confirmation or verification is not a relation
between a theory and evidence, but a process of selection from amongst rival candidates,” and as
Stinchcombe (1968:20) argues, stating that a strong test of theory requires researchers to
“consider the alternative theories which might be explanations” for the observed phenomena.
When implemented rigorously, comparative testing disciplines researchers not to unduly fasten
their affections (Chamberlin, 1931; Kuhn, 1970). While multiple theories of organizational
change exist beyond behavioral theory, one obvious alternative to managers’ satisficing around
aspirations is rationally maximizing around expectations.
One should not be dissuaded from comparative testing even though “it is difficult to
differentiate maximizing from satisficing” because “most decisions are interpretable in either
way” (March and Heath,1994: 20-21). In this sense, this work is different from Lant (1992: 641)
who is interpreted as being unconcerned about her conclusion that “there may be a close
relationship (emphasis added) between expectations and aspirations.” If there is a likelihood of
collinearity between the constructs then it is premature to assume that either perspective is wellsupported unless empiricists simultaneously test both hypotheses. Without comparatively testing
one explanation against the other, it is unclear whether one perspective dominates the other, or if
both add explanatory power. A review suggests that “a sizeable empirical research stream”
(Argote and Greve, 2007: 343) on aspirations ignores comparative testing against the expectation
hypothesis. This disregard is clearly at odds with philosophies of Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1974),
and Stinchcombe (1968), who emphasize the power in being comparative.2 It also contrasts with

2
Some schools of philosophy disagree on the necessity of comparative testing. For example, relativists believe alternative
theories can peacefully co-exist if they describe a phenomenon equally well, but have different causal mechanisms. Lakatos
(1974) has criticized this position because it requires certainty about the independence of those explanations.
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the founders of the satisficing view (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon 1997b) who recognize
theoretical uniqueness hinges on whether empiricists can discern if maximizing or satisficing
best describe managerial decision-making.3
In response to this premise, this study contributes to the literature in two important ways.
First, it is demonstrated that several foundational studies purporting to provide empirical support
for aspiration level decision-making--those of Lant and Montgomery (1987), Lant (1992), Greve,
(1998), and Mezias et al. (2002)--may actually represent maximizing behavior. To consider this
potential, simulation is used to develop a sample of agents who choose strategies by maximizing
expectations. It is shown that the agents may be perceived as satisficing, even when aspirations
are absent from the data. A plethora of robustness tests, confirm it is remarkably easy to confirm
satisficing behavior when the true causality is rational choice. These findings clearly do not
invalidate prior research, but strongly imply that empiricists who study organizational change
through the lens of aspirations need more explicitly to rule out maximization as an alternative
explanation for their findings.
Second, recommendations for comparative testing are offered and implemented to
demonstrate their reliability. Again, simulation is valuable because the true causality is known,
making it possible to ascertain whether the recommendations are effective at the elimination of
Type I and Type II errors for both behavioral theory and rational choice. To accomplish this, the
recommendations are examined across three scenarios--when causality is maximizing, when it is
satisficing, and when a mixture of maximizing and satisficing is occurring. While this focus on
simulated data does not illuminate evidence in favor of any one theory, it does demonstrate
3
Simon (1997b: 22) argues “. . . empirical evidence . . . would determine which theory is the correct one.” In relation to the
behavioral theory they develop, Cyert and March (1992: 177) explain “the adequacy of the theory is tested by using it as a basis
for decisions and comparing the result with the result obtained from decisions derived from alternatives rules.”
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sophisticated techniques built soundly upon theory which then can be practically implemented
for comparative testing in non-simulated, real world contexts. This final effort provides a
roadmap for future research that seeks to understand the boundary conditions of both theories.
To be clear, this paper is not challenging the theoretical uniqueness of behavioral theory.
Rather, theoretical uniqueness is assumed, and the focus is on empirical discrimination.
However, it is important to emphasize that the theoretical implications of comparative testing are
consequential. Chamberlin (1931: 163-164) advocates several benefits to comparative testing
beyond empirical discrimination. They “whet the discriminative edge of each” theory, which
tends to sharpen the analytic process by specifying more closely the criteria differentiating the
hypotheses. They promote “fertility” in research processes, as “each hypothesis suggests its own
criteria, its own means of proof, its own method of developing the truth; and if a group of
hypotheses encompass the subject on all sides, the total outcome of means and of methods is full
and rich.” Finally, they urge discipline in not emotionally fixing one’s attention or devotion
unduly on a single theoretical explanation. Thus, comparatively testing whether change is guided
by satisficing or maximizing behavior will amplify and clarify the scope of each hypothesis.
While some find offensive our targeting of satisficing behavior, this focus is consistent with the
aim of contributing to a target audience: scholars who research organizations.

2. Discriminating Between Alternative Rationalizations of Organizational Change
Argote and Greve (2007: 343) argue that the theory in Cyert and March (1963):
most directly predicts organizational search and change.
Problemistic search implies that organizational aspiration levels
adapt to the past experience of the focal organization and those of
5
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comparable organizations. Once organizational performance falls
below the aspiration level, search for solutions will occur and
organizational changes become more likely.
This theory has become a leading theory to explain organizational change and its
empirical predictions have received “good support” (Argote and Greve, 2007: 343).4 The
literature yields findings nearly universally consistent with the theoretical propositions of
behavioral theory (BT) and suggests that past performance, past aspirations, and past
performance of comparable firms determine their aspirations; furthermore, organizational change
is predicted by the relationship of performance to historical or social aspirations. Moreover,
evidence suggests the likelihood of change is not symmetric around the deviation of performance
from aspirations—performance above aspirations induces a greater likelihood of change.
A meaningful test of BT, and specifically the role of aspirations in organizational change,
requires that it be considered against alternative explanations of the phenomena. The most likely
alternative is that organizational change is guided by rational choice (RC)—firms viewed as
unitary actors selecting alternatives that maximize expected utility.5 Comparative testing
between BT and RC is not a trivial exercise, partly because considerable theoretical overlap may
exist between them. Simon (1978: 503) emphasizes that “In long-run equilibrium it might even
be the case that choice with dynamically adapting aspiration levels would be equivalent to
optimal choice, taking the costs of search into account.” Schwartz et al. (2002: 1178) argue “A
satisficer thus often moves in the direction of maximization without ever having it as a deliberate

4

Reviews of empirical studies on organizational aspirations can be found in Greve (2003) and Nickel and Rodriguez (2002).

5

It is doubtful that anyone would disagree with this claim. Cyert and March (1992) criticize the RC approach, and explicitly
challenge the maximization hypothesis. That the challenge is without potential for compromise is manifested in two ideas they
express: (1) an assumption of “an approximate sequential consideration of alternatives” (p. 134) rather than a simultaneous
consideration of multiple alternatives, and (2) their conclusion that decision processes are “dominated in large part by nonexpectational factors” (p. 75). Note that the decision heuristic described by Cyert and March (1963) differs from that offered by
Simon (1997a) and March and Simon (1959). As indicated, an entire body of theoretical and empirical work has followed with
the decision heuristic developed by Cyert and March (1963), so it is this heuristic on which this paper is focused.
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goal.” Cyert and DeGroot (1974: 522) raise concerns about the theoretical and empirical
uniqueness of expectations from social aspirations. “Because formulating the alternative theories
and deriving their consequences is preeminently a theoretical task,” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 28) it is
important to clarify what constitutes maximizing behavior in RC and satisficing behavior in BT.
Subsequent to the clarification is an evaluation of how the empirical literature distinguishes
between satisficing and maximizing.
2.1 Subjective Rationality as an Alternative to Behavioral Theory
The decision heuristic common to every characterization of RC is maximization – agents prefer
the alternative providing the highest utility, and will change to that alternative from status quo if
doing so provides a higher expected utility. Satisficers are unconcerned about comparing utilities
across alternatives. They focus on whether current performance is satisfactory relative to aspired
performance, and if it is not they change to the first available alternative. This paper emphasizes
the need for comparative testing of whether these heuristics lead to fundamentally different
outcomes. As described in the previous paragraph, it is not obvious that they should.
The challenge of comparatively testing RC and BT is enhanced by our inability to know
with certainty how expectations or aspirations are determined by agents. It is therefore necessary
to make instrumental assumptions about the formation of expectations and aspirations. For
example, Simon (1997a: 84) recognizes that we might assume that agents are objectively rational
in that they maximize based on complete knowledge and perfect processing capabilities, or we
might assume them to be subjectively rational by maximizing attainment relative to their actual
knowledge.6 Similarly, we might assume what performance is deemed “satisfactory” to be based
on a complete history of performance or weighted more heavily on recent histories, or it might
6

Objectively rational agents might also consider of their rival’s likely responses, as epitomized in game theory.
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be based on historical or social comparisons. Since it is necessary to make instrumental
assumptions to implement a comparative test, one should be careful to clearly denote the
assumptions underlying their characterization of the comparative theories to demarcate the
applicability of their test. We choose to implement comparative tests between BT and subjective
rationality, as defined by Simon (1997a), and consistent with Arrow (1951) and Sen (1997).7
This choice was made partly because it is preferable to comparatively test a more general
interpretation of theory (Stinchcombe, 1968), and partly because of the extraordinary
computational complexities associated with imparting perfect knowledge and processing
capabilities on a sample of numerous and heterogeneous agents. It is essential to emphasize that
subjectively rational agents maximize with the information they possess – they do not
intentionally satisfice. The specific ways in which subjectively rational behavior and satisficing
behavior are instrumented is described more carefully in later sections.
2.2 An Absence of Comparative Tests Between Satisficing and Maximizing
Graham Allison (1969) was one of the first to explicitly compare how organizational change
might be driven by either changes in expectations or changes in performance relative to
aspirations. He emphasized how BT and RC differentially explain events around the Cuban
Missile Crisis, but seemed uninterested in comparatively testing which theory best explained the
events.8 There is no evidence of any serious challenges to aspiration-based reasoning with RC
reasoning, such as would be the case in the presence of comparative testing. Some work has
7
Simon (1997a: 84) specifically refers to a decision being “subjectively rational if it maximizes attainment relative to the actual
knowledge of the subject.” Arrow (1951: 406) described “rational behavior simply means behavior in accordance with some
ordering of alternatives in terms of relative desirability,” and Sen (1997: 746) suggests that maximization “only requires choosing
an alternative that is not judged to be worse than any other.” Note that these three Nobel laureates place maximization at the
center of their descriptions of rationality. There is no requirement that agents have complete knowledge.
8

It is noteworthy that Allison (1969: 694) also recognized that maximization was the fundamental RC proposition: “An increase
[/a decrease] in the cost of an alternative, i.e., a reduction [/an increase] in the value of the set of consequences which will follow
from that action, or a reduction [/an increase] in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, reduces [/increases] the
likelihood of that alternative being chosen.”
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acknowledged the potential for RC to explain the observed outcome, but these studies fall
considerably short of a comparative test. For example, Lant and Montgomery (1987), Greve
(1998), and Iyer and Miller (2008), admit organizational change can be described through the
lens of RC, but they ultimately reason it is unlikely for their empirical contexts (Markstrat
simulations, radio broadcasting, and acquisitions, respectively). Pertinent is the advice of
Camerer and Weber (1999: 62), who explain that comparative tests are most effectively made
“with data that clearly rule out an alternative hypothesis than with mere reason and argument.”
The most direct attempt to consider RC alongside BT is the work of Lant (1992). She was
interested in determining whether sales targets in the Markstrat game are better predicted by
rational expectations or by attainment discrepancy (performance relative to aspirations). She
considered two attainment discrepancy models: that of Lewin et al. (1944), which focuses on
aspirations of individuals, and that of Levinthal and March (1981), which characterizes
organizational aspirations. Lant (1992) found that the model of Lewin et al. (1944) predicted
sales targets better than the model of Levinthal and March (1981) or the RC model. Interestingly,
she did find that under certain conditions, the attainment discrepancy models and the RC model
converged in their predictive ability, suggesting that, under those circumstances, a strong
correlation may exist between aspirations and expectations. Despite her contributions, for three
reasons this work fails to conduct a comparative test between BT and RC. First, it does not test
the key proposition that attainment discrepancy predicts organizational change, and instead
focuses on predicting sales targets because they are believed to represent aspirations. Second, if
whether or not sales targets actually represent aspirations or expectations is ambiguous, then the
finding that attainment discrepancy models best fit the data does not necessarily mean that sales
targets represent aspirations. The correct conclusion ultimately hinges on how accurately the

9
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models characterize the theory. Lant (1992) implicitly adopted an assumption that expectations
could not be adapted based on performance relative to prior expectations. While scholars
sometimes disallow adaptive expectations to facilitate model convergence, it is important to
recognize that adaptive expectations might easily be instrumented in RC. Nobel laureate Kenneth
Arrow (1971: 171) states that the “observer of the outcome of an activity can be supposed to
form new probability judgements,” and Cyert and DeGroot (1974) provide one example of how
expectations are adapted by new information. Surprisingly, Lant (1992:627) recognizes that
“organization theorists have adopted models of adaptive expectations from the economic
literature,” but she does not incorporate such adaptation in her own test of RC. Finally, while her
Markstrat players have two alternative brands around which she predicts sales targets, she
estimates separate models for each brand. By doing so, her estimation treats the sales targets of
the brands as independent of one another, a conclusion in clear opposition of the maximization
behavior based on comparative expectations. Consequently, the participants of the game might
have maximized in their choice over relative quantities of the two goods.
In light of Lant’s (1992) finding that predictions using aspirations and expectations may
converge, the fact that no paper explicitly rules out maximizing behavior is surprising. The
closest attempt at doing so seems to be the work of Iyer and Miller (2008) who study how
aspirations affect the hazard of acquisition. They include the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio to
proxy for its growth options, which might be interpreted as an attempt to control for available
alternatives. Curiously, their finding that the probability of acquisition decreases with
performance below aspirations contradicts the view that change behavior is driven by
problemistic search, advocated by BT.

10

RATIONALIZING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
To summarize, despite recognition that BT and RC are competing explanations for
change, the empirical literature fails to explicitly compare BT against its most probable
theoretical competitor (RC). This oversight raises concern as to whether confirmations of
aspiration-level decision-making are false positive confirmations, also known as Type I errors,
resulting from a spurious relationship where the true causality may be maximizing. In Section 3
this concern is empirically examined. For this purpose, simulation has one key advantage relative
to studies of real data–the true causality is known because it is determined ex ante.
3. Is it Possible to Diagnose Satisficing When Maximizing is Occurring?
This section investigates the potential for committing a Type I error by falsely confirming BT
when it is not true. We do so by:
•

simulating a sample of subjectively rational agents (firms) that maximize in their
decision-making by estimating performance expectations for each alternative;	
  

•

inferring aspirations from the subjectively rational agents–it is common to empirically
derive aspirations and identify them to be behavioral, but when using these same
methods to identify aspirations it is known there is nothing behavioral about them
because agents are predetermined to be maximizers; 	
  

•

fitting the simulated data to models purporting to provide foundational support for
aspiration-level decision-making to observe whether Type I errors obtain in the
simulated data, indicating that BT is confirmed when the true causality is RC; and	
  

•

ascertaining how robust Type I errors appear in the simulated data.

	
  

This process reveals that Type I errors in research confirming BT may be consequential. Section
4 develops recommendations for overcoming Type I and Type II errors in BT and RC.
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3.1. Simulating a Sample of Subjectively Rational Agents Who Maximize
Simulation is used to predict change among a population of agents. Change is simulated through
rational choice, implemented via expected utility maximization as specified by Arrow (1971) and
Pratt (1964), where utility is a function of wealth. One redeeming quality of this approach is that
enables quantification of utilities across a wide range of risk attitudes. Since expected outcomes
matter differently to agents with different risk attitudes, quantification is valuable for
ascertaining change behavior. One key element of the model is agents are randomly endowed
with one of five risk attitudes as noted in Appendix A, three types of risk averse utilities and two
types of risk seeking utilities. The other two key elements to the model are the calculation of
actual and expected utilities. Expected utilities are important since they dictate strategy choice.
3.1.1 Calculating Actual Utilities
In the model, each agent i gets utility, Uijt, for participating in strategy j at time t, where
U ijt = U(W ijt ) = U(W it−1 − S + Iijt )

(1),

indicating that utility is a function of wealth, Wijt. Wijt is determined by wealth at the beginning of
€

a period (Wit-1), the cost of switching strategies (S) when a switch happens, and an agent’s
income under a strategy (Iijt). All agents are assigned zero wealth in the first period. S is
randomly drawn from the distribution U (0, 0.01) for each run of the simulation, but within a run
is invariant across time or strategy. Iijt is determined by random variables D1t, D2t, D3t, D4t, and D5t
representing the population’s income for each of the five strategies. Djt is shared equally by all njt
agents choosing the strategy based on expectations (equation 2 below), such that Iijt=Ijt= Djt/njt.
In period 1, each Dj1 is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 5). Every period
thereafter, each Djt is adjusted by uncertainty δjt, drawn for each strategy from distribution U (-λ,
λ), and λ is a parameter drawn once in the beginning of each run from distribution U (0,10).
12
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Thus, Iijt is determined by the initial draw for a strategy (Dj1), the exogenous uncertainty for a
strategy each period (δjt), and the number of agents choosing a strategy (njt). If agents were risk
neutral, Uijt would be a linear function of Wijt. However, since they have different risk attitudes,
they calculate Uijt by different formulas, specified in Appendix A.
3.1.2 Calculating Expected Utilities
Since agents make choices before Uijt’s are observed, change is determined by their expectations,
E[Uijt]’s.9 In the first period (t=1), strategies are randomly assigned, but for each t>1, agents
choose the strategy, j*t, providing the highest expected utility:
Choose j *t , where

E[U ij*t ] = max{ E[U ij(1)t ];E[U ij( 2)t ];E[U ij( 3)t ];E[U ij(4 )t ];E[U ij(5)t ]}

(2).

Since Wit-1 and S are invariant to strategy choice, the primary variable affecting expected utility
€

is the income for each strategy, Iijt. Agents cannot perfectly anticipate Iijt because of exogenous
uncertainty (δjt) and their inability to observe njt until the end of the period. Instead, they estimate
a discrete probability distribution for each Iijt to use in the calculation of E[Uijt]’s.10 Specifically,
for each strategy j and period t, agents calculate E[Uijt]’s by:
a) calculating the probability of achieving income, by observing all prior incomes in
strategy j that fall within discrete intervals s (s=1,…,12), and estimating the historical
frequency (pjts) that income falls within discrete interval s (Note that since all agents have
the same information, they form the same probabilities, pjts’s);

9

“Expectations” refer to the expected value of a random variable, defined in probability theory as the integral of the random
variable with respect to its probability measure.
10

The model is too complex to represent the cumulative distribution analytically. It is common to represent the cumulative
discretely when analytical solutions are infeasible. The choice of twelve discrete intervals was the authors, and involves a
tradeoff between precision and computation intensity. Each interval has an identical range, and the complete range over all
intervals is the same for all strategies and determined by observing the range of all Iijt across all prior periods.
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b) calculating utility under the midpoint incomes (Iijts) of each interval s, such that Uijts =
Wijts = Wit-1 – S + Iijts, and based on formulas specified in Appendix A;
c) multiplying pjts and Uijts for each s; and
d) summing the twelve products derived in (c). 	
  
The heuristic dictates that change occurs when E[Uij*t] > E[Uij*t-1], unless agents are
constrained because Wit-1<S, where they choose strategy jt=j*t-1. It is entirely consistent with the
principle of maximization underlying choice for subjectively rational agents, whose actual
knowledge we specify. Satisficing behavior is not present.
The simulation is run 200 times, each involving 100 agents over thirty periods, resulting
in 600,000 observations.11 200 runs were estimated to eliminate the consequences of random
assignments of initial parameters. Table 1 illustrates one agent’s decisions.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
3.2 Inferring “Aspirations” from the Sample of Maximizers
Even though satisficing behavior is absent from the sample, historical and social aspirations can
be derived using methods common to BT. To infer historical aspirations (A) for each agent, the
model of Levinthal and March (1981) is used:
Ait = αPit−1 + (1− α )Ait−1

(3),

where α is a weight coefficient, 0≤α≤1, dictating the emphasis placed on an agent’s prior
€

performance, Pit-1, versus aspirations in the prior period, Ait-1. In the simulated model, Pit-1 is

11

All agents persist throughout the 30 periods because the benchmarks experiments of Lant (1992) and Lant and Montgomery
(1987) do not allow for entry and exit of subjects.
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equivalent to Iij*t-1, the prior income under the optimal strategy j*. Like in Greve (1998), the
choice of α was determined by which value provided the best model fit, which was α=0.5.
To infer social aspirations (B), Greve’s (1998) is used:
km

∑P

it−1

Bmt =

(4).

1

km

Bmt represents the mean income of all km agents in social reference group m in period t-1, where
€

m is dictated by risk attitude.12 Again, Pit-1 is the income derived in the prior period, Iij*t-1.
The derivation of historical (A) and social (B) aspirations from the simulated data is
helpful for several reasons. First, one can be completely confident that the derived aspirations are
not behavioral because agents are predetermined to be rational. Second, since they were derived
from methods common to BT implies that it is possible to infer aspirations in real data that are
merely a manifestation of maximizing behavior. Indeed, this represents the concern about
committing Type I error when falsely confirming BT. Third, it is now possible to test how potent
this concern might be by using the data to replicate prior research confirming support for BT. If
replications using aspirations derived from the simulation create similar results revealed in these
foundational empirical analyses, then the concern about Type I error in these prior studies is
accentuated, underscoring the imperative necessity of comparative testing.

12
Festinger (1954) developed the concept of social reference groups for individuals, not organizations. The behavioral literature
has adapted the concept to organizations and uses different criteria for identifying social reference groups, such as firm size or the
2-digit SIC code. In the simulated data, risk attitude represents the most pertinent basis for social comparisons.
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3.3 Fitting the Simulated Data to Foundational Models Purporting to Support Aspirationbased Decision-Making
Concerns about spurious support for BT emanate from (a) the correlation between expectations
and aspirations, and (b) the potential for expectations, and not aspirations, to be the true causal
factor. Historical aspirations (A) and social aspirations (B) are correlated (p<0.001) with
expectations (E[Uij*t]) at 0.33 and 0.19, respectively.13 Correlations in real data might be equally
high because both aspirations and expectations derive from past performance. However, these
constructs are unique in that historical aspirations are based on an agent’s own history of
performance, social aspirations are based on the immediate past performance of related others,
and expectations are based on maximization over all historical performance of all firms across
alternative strategies. Correlation does not imply causation.
The first examination into whether expectations might be the true causal factor
underlying studies confirming BT involves a replication of three studies that have investigated
aspiration formation in real data. In contrast to the empirically derived aspirations of Levinthal
and March (1981) and Greve (1998), Lant (1992), Lant and Montgomery (1987), and Mezias et
al. (2002) all assume that aspirations are represented by sales targets (T) specified in
questionnaires, and predict them in the following way:
Tit = β0 + β1Tit −1 + β 2 ( Pit −1 − Tit −1 ) + β3 ( Pit −1 − Bit −1 ) + eit

(5),

where Pit-1 is an agent’s performance in the prior period, (Pit-1–Tit-1) is an agent’s attainment
discrepancy relative to historical aspirations, and (Pit-1–Bit-1) is attainment discrepancy relative to
social aspirations. Lant (1992) and Lant and Montgomery (1987) assume β3=0, implying

13
A and B are correlated at 0.75, which is similar to the 0.65 correlation Greve (1998) reported for attainment discrepancies
involving historical and social aspiration. Unreported analysis suggests that significant correlations between aspirations and
expectations are robust across time periods and in Spearman and Kendall Tau rank tests.
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aspirations are not determined by social comparison, but only historical aspirations. The three
studies claim confirmation that sales targets represent aspirations because in each case Tit is
positively affected by Tit-1 and negatively affected by attainment discrepancy. However, the
confirmations are spurious if sales targets truly represent expectations.
While it may never be known whether sales targets are expectations or aspirations, the
true causality is known in the simulated data, enabling an assessment of whether expectations
might be predicted in the same way as aspirations. The data are fit to the models used in those
prior studies, except that Tit is replaced with E[Iij*t] and Pit-1 is represented by Iij*t-1.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
Table 2 illustrates the results alongside those of the three papers noted above. Note that
each replicated model produces coefficients that are significant and identical in direction. These
results show complete convergence–the same factors that have influenced sales targets in prior
studies influenced expected income in this study. This result has several implications. First, sales
targets may represent expectations and not aspirations. While some may dismiss this logic
because expectations may derive from aspirations, in the simulated data it is certain that
expectations do not emanate from aspirations. Second, prior support for the effect of social
comparison may be spurious, because an identical result is replicated when social aspirations do
not exist in the data. Third, aspiration formation model tested in prior research may be too
accommodating and unable to discriminate between expectations and aspirations.
A much less safe BT model is replicated in the second examination of whether
expectations might be the true causal factor underlying studies confirming BT. Greve’s (1998)
study of organizational change offers a more specific prediction--that the negative relationship
for attainment discrepancy is stronger when a firm performs above its aspiration than when it
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performs below its aspiration.14 Such a prediction might have been lauded by Popper (1963: 36)
who advocated that “confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions”
rather than “safe” ones. The fact that Greve (1998) found support for his hypotheses is
compelling evidence in favor of BT. He did not, however, consider that expectations might be
driving his result. His pooled logit model is replicated with the simulated data:
log

Pr(Yit = 1)
= τ 0 + τ 1[ I it −1 − Ait −1 ] > 0 + τ 2[ I it −1 − Ait −1 ] < 0 + τ 3[ I it −1 − Bit −1 ] > 0 + τ 4[ I it −1 − Bit −1 ] < 0 + τ 5 X i 5 + ... + τ n X in + ε
1 − Pr(Yit = 1)

(6),

where Yit=1 if a strategy change occurred for agent i and Yit=0 otherwise; A and B represent
historical and social aspirations, respectively; Pit-1 is again represented by Iij*t-1; Nit-1 is a negative
inconsistency variable explicating the cases when performance falls between the two aspirations;
and Xin represents the remaining vector of variables, which are ignored because of the controlled
environment. Greve’s (1998) two main hypotheses predict that τ1,τ2,τ3, and τ4 should all be
negative, and τ1<τ2 and τ3<τ4.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
Table 3 shows results alongside those of Greve (1998). Note that these results mirror Greve’s
(1998), confirming the risky prediction noted immediately above. The main difference is that
Greve (1998) estimated his model on real data in the radio broadcasting industry and cannot be
sure of causality, while there is certainty that satisficing is not causing this result. Again, it seems
that prior empirical support for BT may be subject to Type I error.
3.4 Ascertaining how robust Type I errors appear in the simulated data
To assure that the results are not endemic to the original specifications, a plethora of robustness
tests were undertaken. The replications in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrated remarkable robustness:
14

See Appendix B for Greve’s hypotheses.
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(a) after removing the budget constraint (Wijt<S), because some may argue that capital is readily
available; (b) across ten deciles of switching costs (S); (c) across five different risk attitudes (m);
(d) across ten deciles of uncertainty (λ); and (e) across all values of the weight coefficient (α) for
aspiration formation. Replications were confirmed across many of these robustness checks. For
example, the signs of coefficients were robust, as was the replication of Lant and Montgomery
(1987) and Lant (1989). The replication of Mezias et al. (2002) was confirmed across all
specifications for coefficients related to aspirations and attainment discrepancy, although the
coefficient for social comparison was not supported in a few specifications. In almost every case,
Greve’s (1998) hypotheses for a negative relationship for attainment discrepancy are confirmed.
While failing to always simultaneously confirm his hypotheses 1B and 2B, either hypothesis 1B
or 2B (see Table 9) are always confirmed. Finally, to consider whether the confirmations were
due to the fact that five strategies were considered, the data were re-simulated with alternative
numbers of strategies (i.e., 1-10, 30, 100), and tests continue to commit Type I error. These
robustness checks demonstrate that, across a full array of model specifications, it is possible to
diagnose aspirations when they are absent. These results should be clear evidence that
comparative testing is needed to rule out alternative explanations and raise suspicion about prior
support for BT.
4.0 Recommendations for Comparative Testing
This section offers recommendations for scholars interested in designing a study suitable for
comparative testing between RC and BT. These recommendations focus on operationalizing the
unique theoretical constructs and evaluating statistical tests capable of comparative testing. More
generally, distinguishing between BT and RC is challenging because it is not desirable to reduce
the risk of Type I error while excessively enhancing the risk of Type II error--where BT (or RC)
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is falsely rejected when it is present. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the
recommendations across different contexts–where the investigated causality (e.g., BT) is present,
and where it is not. Specifically, three plausible scenarios in an empirical setting are investigated:
true causality is pure maximizing behavior (as explained in section 3.1); true causality is pure
satisficing behavior (explained in Appendix B); and true causality is a mixture of maximizing
and satisficing behavior (explained in Appendix C, 60% of agents are satisficers and 40% are
maximizers). This third scenario is invoked because it may be empirically plausible, and it
enables a check for robustness in the most challenging empirical scenario–the context of mixed
behavior. Table 4 clarifies the types of errors that might exist across these different contexts.
Given that the true causality is known in each context, it is possible to test the effectiveness of
the recommendations in simultaneously coping with Type I and II error. Since larger samples are
the only way to simultaneously reduce the risks of both errors (Neter, Wasserman, and
Whitmore, 1988), the effectiveness of our recommendations is examined on samples with nearly
600,000 observations. In practice, however, large samples may not always be feasible, so we
report how robust our recommendations are in smaller samples.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
Recommendations are presented in increasing order of technical sophistication. The
recommendation researchers choose and adopt is best guided by their relative advantages and
disadvantages, discussed below.
4.1 Recommendation 1: Deliberate Controls
The first recommendation follows directly from Stinchcombe (1968), who recommends the
deliberate control of the value of possible spurious variables. Critical to this recommendation are
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accurate operationalizations of maximizing/satisficing behavior and appropriate modeling
techniques.
4.1.1 Operationalizing Maximization
Section 3 has already detailed Greve’s (1989) operationalization of satisficing behavior. March
and Heath (1994: 20) advocate accounting for maximizing behavior through “the relative
position of alternatives.” This statement is interpreted to refer to the relative expected payoff to
alternatives, which can be estimated in many cases. If alternatives can be enumerated, along with
a reliable proxy for their expected payoffs, it is possible to identify whether firms are choosing
strategies with the highest expected outcome (i.e., maximizing). For example, when studying
whether attainment discrepancy affects the decision to acquire a target, as was done by Iyer and
Miller (2008), expected payoffs for acquiring alternative targets can be estimated with indicators
readily available in Compustat or CRSP, such as the price-to-earnings multiple, which
DePamphlis (2003) suggested bidders actually use.15 When studying format changes in the radio
broadcasting industry, Greve (1998) might have been able to estimate the “relative position of
alternatives” through a comparison of expected sizes of target audiences for alternative formats.
One way to the measure the relative value of alternatives is the Fechner Index (Fechner,
1966), which is the standardized difference between the expected utilities of two alternatives:
Fechner Index =

E[U1 ] − E[U 2 ]
η1 − η2

(7),

where η1 and η2 are noise parameters denoting errors made by agents in estimating E[U1] and
E[U2], respectively.16 Equation 7 is modified in three ways. First, it is adapted to the context of
organizational change, where one alternative is status quo (sq) and the other alternative is the
15

Alternative candidates for acquisition might be determined by identifying firms in the same market.

16

In empirical setting, the denominator in equation 8 is to be estimated (see Harrison, 2008).
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maximum of alternative strategies. Second, the denominator is eliminated because the simulated
agents do not make mistakes. The denominator should be retained in contexts involving nonsimulated data. Third, since in real data utility is an unobservable function of wealth depending
upon latent risk preferences, the index is simplified by assuming risk-neutral utility functions.
Consequently, the modified index considers differences in expected wealth, where Wjt = Ijt+Wjt-1S.17 Note that while this simplification enhances empirical applicability, it sacrifices rigor in
estimating utility maximization, which may make it more difficult to obtain support for RC. The
modified index can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of remaining in the status quo, and the
name is revised accordingly:
Opportunity Cost it = max{E[Wi , j ≠ sq ,t ]} − E[Wi , j = sq ,t ]

(8).

Since maximizing agents change strategies whenever Opportunity Costjt > 0, opportunity cost
should be operationalized as a dichotomous variable, such that Opportunity Cost Dummyjt = “1”
if Opportunity Costjt > 0, and “0” otherwise.
4.1.2 Modeling Organizational Change with Deliberate Controls
Having derived a proxy for opportunity cost, we use Tables 5-7 to show how Opportunity Cost
Dummy and Greve’s (1998) operationalization of aspirations impact the testing of the null
hypothesis that a theory does not explain organizational change. Two models are used to
estimate organizational change: pooled logit as in Greve (1998) and random effects logit to
account for time and cross-sectional dependence. The implementation of a random effects model
may be needed to appropriately account for path dependence emphasized in both theories, while
pooled models assume temporal independence of observations. Failure to apply appropriate
estimation techniques may result in misdiagnosing support for a theory.
17

After eliminating the denominator, the Fechner Index becomes E[U(Wj sq,t)]-E[U(Wj=sq,t)]. S is not in the second term because
under the status quo alternative, switching cost is not relevant.
≠
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4.1.3 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 1
Table 5 illustrates models fitted to the data where the true causality is RC, and helps in
assessing whether the recommendation is useful in ruling out a false positive (Type I error) for
BT and a false negative (Type II error) for RC (cells A and B in Table 4). Column 1 replicates
column 2 of Table 3, which was already demonstrated to be a Type I error. Column 2 of Table 5
fits an alternative model aimed at diagnosing RC, using Opportunity Cost Dummy. As expected,
Opportunity Cost Dummy is positive, suggesting agents are more likely to prefer change when
the opportunity cost of the status quo is positive. Column 3 implements the first
recommendation, by combining the BT variables with Opportunity Cost Dummy in a pooled logit
model.18 This combined model yields a positive and significant Opportunity Cost Dummy,
implying the recommendation rules out Type II error for RC. It also shows some ability to
eliminate (Type I error) false confirmation of BT because robust support for BT is lost: social
aspirations are rejected, while spurious support for historical aspirations persists. Replicating the
comparative model in a random effects logit in column 5 significantly improves model fit and
completely eradicates (Type I error) the spurious support for BT found in column 3, and avoids
Type II error by revealing a positive coefficient for Opportunity Cost Dummy.
(Insert Tables 5 ,6, and 7 about here)
Table 6 illustrates models fitted to the data where the true causality is BT. This table
helps assess whether the recommendation is useful in ruling out a false positive (Type I error) for
RC and a false negative (Type II error) for BT (cells C and D in Table 4). Column 1 fits a
behavioral model and demonstrates that agents change strategies based on aspirations as

18
The combined model is an improvement over models 1, as expected. Interestingly, it is also an improvement over model 2,
which is attributed to the fact that a relatively primitive model is used relying on the assumption that the coefficient is the same
for all agents. Since there are five distinct risk attitudes present in the data, this should not be the case.
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predicted by Greve (1998). This confirmation of BT creates confidence that Greve’s (1998)
formalization of Cyert and March (1963) is implemented correctly in the simulation.19 Column 2
fits an alternative model aimed at diagnosing RC, but the model is not significant. Column 3
implements the first recommendation in a pooled model. This comparative model yields robust
estimates for both social and historical aspirations, ruling out Type II error with respect to BT. It
also rules out Type I error because Opportunity Cost Dummy is insignificant, it does not falsely
confirm RC. These results hold up in a random effects logit model.
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that recommendation 1 is effective at
eliminating Type I and II errors when the data generating processes are pure – all agents use
either RC or BT. Table 7 illustrates models fitted to data where the true causality is a mixture of
BT and RC. Since both heuristics are present, this scenario will help assess whether the
recommendation is useful in ruling out false negatives (Type II error) for both RC and BT.
Models of mixed data will not help in ruling out false positives (Type I errors) because they
cannot occur if both behaviors are present. Opportunity Cost Dummy is insignificant across all
models in the table, suggesting that we commit a Type II error, because we know RC is used by
40 percent of the sample. BT is largely supported in our comparative tests (models 3 and 5),
although it should be noted that support for social aspirations is lost in the random effects logit.
These findings do not embolded great confidence that recommendation 1 is effective in
discriminating between theories in the presence of mixed behavior.
To assure that the recommendation was capable of discriminating between theories in
smaller samples, we also tested the effectiveness of recommendation 1 across forty samples of
14,000 observations, where agents were randomly drawn without replacement. Note that each of
19

Also, note that there is a close relationship between the estimated coefficients in column 1 of table 6 with the parameters in the
simulation explained in Appendix B.
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these subsamples included fewer observations than Greve’s (1989) sample. When the true
causality is RC, Type I and Type II errors are avoided in all forty samples. When the true
causality is BT, Type I error was avoided in all forty samples, and Type II error occurred in one
of forty samples (we falsely confirmed RC 5 percent of the time). When the true causality is
mixed, Type II error for BT was avoided in all 40 cases, but Type II error for RC occurred in 95
percent of the cases. In short, these results on smaller samples show an identical pattern to the
pattern of results reported in Tables 5-7.
In summary, a key advantage of the first recommendation is the practicality in developing
a proxy for opportunity cost and modeling it alongside BT. A disadvantage is the assumption of
a simplified utility function, although we found no evidence of that this simplification placed the
recommendation in jeopardy when data generating processes was pure. Another potential
shortcoming is that combining RC and BT in a single model assumes their independence, and
will lead to biased estimates if this assumption is false. Despite these concerns, this first
recommendation prevented Type I and II errors across all pure scenarios, and was always
effective at preventing Type II error for BT in mixed behavior when 60 percent of the agents
were satisficers, but in that scenario was relatively inefficient in preventing Type II error for RC.
4.2 Recommendation 2: Test of Non-Nested Alternative Hypotheses
Recommendation 1 encourages ascribing variables from different theoretical models into a single
empirical model. This is perhaps the most common approach to testing competing theories. It is
equivalent to saying that the two theories are nested in a combined model, which implies that
each of them “can be reduced to the other [combined] model” (Clarke, 2001: 727). To clarify,
the following equations correspond to columns 1-3 in tables 5-7:
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H BT :

Y = ωX 1 + θ

(9a )

H RC :

Y = ψX 2 + ρ

(9b)

H Combined :

Y = ωX 1 + ψX 2 + π (9c)

where Y is organizational change; X1 and X2 are vectors of variables; ω and ψ are coefficient
vectors; and θ, ρ, and π are errors. The models 3 and 5, fit in Tables 5-7, rely on the assumption
that X1 and X2 are not co-determined. If X1 and X2 are co-determined then estimates in the
combined model (9c) will be biased. While one approach would be to estimate the combined
model (9c) after controlling for endogeneity via instrumental variable probit, when there are no
strong instruments for potentially endogenous parameters, this approach may reduce the
reliability of estimation compared to models excluding instruments.20 Since there exist no strong
instruments for aspirations and expectations a combined model may not be reliable.
Recommendation 2 overcomes the problem noted above through a non-nested test, which helps
in assessing the relative predictive power of model (9a) versus (9b). This test is particularly
useful when there is a suspicion that one of the models (either 9a or 9b) provides a spurious
correlation between dependent and independent variables.
4.2.1 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 2
In our analysis we use Vuong’s (1989) test, which generates likelihood-ratio based statistics for
testing the null hypothesis that the competing models are equally close to the true data generating
process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is closer. Vuong’s test is noteworthy
for its generality, allowing for theories to “be nested, non-nested, or overlapping, and that both,
only one, or neither of the competing models may contain the true law generating the

20

Hahn and Hausman (2003: 118) discuss the implications of applying weak instruments: “…a researcher may estimate "bad
results" and not be aware of the outcome.” While their work focused on linear models, Adkins (2009) finds that in probit models
weak instruments enhance the bias.
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observations” (p. 307).21 This test can be implemented with or without an adjustment in the
likelihood ratio statistic for the number of parameters in the respective models. Since adjusted
statistics penalize BT models more than RC models because they employ more variables, we use
both adjusted and unadjusted statistics. Table 8 reveals the results of the non-nested test across
our three scenarios. Under each scenario, the test effectively avoids Type I and Type II errors.
(Insert Table 8 about here)
To assure this recommendation is practical in smaller samples, we also tested the
effectiveness of recommendation 2 on 40 samples of 14,000 observations. The non-nested test
proved 100 percent effective at avoiding Type II error when the data generating processes were
pure. In all cases of pure behavior, the adjusted and unadjusted likelihood-ratio statistics were
significant. The non-nested test using the unadjusted likelihood-ratio test also proved 100 percent
effective at avoiding Type II error in mixed behavior. However, we found the adjusted
likelihood-ratio statistic to be 100 percent ineffective at determining BT was the dominant theory
in the data. The fact that adjustment imposes a greater penalty in smaller samples suggests that a
more conservative test should use the unadjusted statistic.
In summary, a key advantage of this recommendation is that it avoids concerns about
endogeneity when theoretical constructs may be co-determined. It is easy to implement and
reliably predicts the dominant causality in the data. Like recommendation 1, it relies on a
simplified utility function. Note that passing such test does not mean that the theory in question
is true, it simply means that the theory is better than the available alternative. Finally, this

21

Other notable non-nested tests are offered by Akaike (1973) and Cox (1961). Compared to the Akaike test, the Vuong test
does not require that a “best” model be chosen if the competing models are statistically equivalent. Compared to the Cox test, the
Vuong test allows for competing models to be either strictly non-nested or overlapping. In the presence of mixed behavior,
allowing for both of these is important.
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recommendation effectively identifies the theory most robustly present in the data, and therefore
more credible, but it does not imply that the losing theory is absent in the data.
4.3 Recommendation 3: Comparative Robustness of Alternative Theories
The third recommendation is similar to recommendation 2 in its aversion to a combined model
(e.g., equation 9c). It is similar to recommendation 1 in testing the null hypothesis that a theory
does not explain organizational change. The emphasis is on the relative robustness of each
separate model (e.g., equations 9a and 9b). Here, a sort of competition, or test of comparative
robustness, is encouraged for how persistent confirmations are to empirical assumptions used to
instrument the theory. While it is well-known that models robust to alterations in empirical
assumptions are less likely to generate Type I error, we advocate that the winner of the
competition is the theory that is more robust to alterations in assumptions, implying it is more
likely to represent the true causality.22 Of course, a number of types of robustness tests may be
reasonable candidates. Below, two specific tests are recommended for a competition between RC
and BT. Each test is described separately, and the results of the competition are summarized.
4.3.1 Robustness Test of RC model
In recommendations 1 and 2, the assumption was made that all firms have the same utility
function. Empirically, utility was estimated through a single coefficient for the Opportunity Cost
Dummy. While this assumption is pragmatic because utilities are latent, firms may have different
utility functions, and correspondingly, may be differentially sensitive to wealth. If the

22

The idea that robustness reduces concerns about Type I error is noted by Wimsatt (1981: 140): “If a result is robust over a
range of parameter values in a given model or over a variety of models making different assumptions, this gives us some
independence of knowledge of the exact structure and parameter values of the system under study: a prediction of this result will
remain true under a variety of such conditions and parameter values. This is particularly important in scientific areas where it
may be difficult to determine the parameter values and conditions exactly.”
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assumption of homogeneity of utilities across firms is relaxed, it is possible to test the robustness
of the initial findings (recommendations 1 and 2) when accounting for heterogeneous utilities.
Very recent developments in econometrics of choice identify latent utility classes using
non-parametric techniques. A non-parametric mixed logit developed by Train (2008) is estimated
under the assumption that an agent’s utility for a particular strategy is a function of wealth under
the strategy, as indicated below:
(10),

U ijt = λiWijt +ν ijt

where λ is a coefficient, and υ represents error.23 Note that because coefficient λ is specific to
each agent i, the model allows heterogeneous utility, and therefore, generates superior fit relative
to models assuming homogeneity. Because the model is designed to achieve superior fit, the
most reliable indicator of the type of behavior dominating the sample is λÙ, the population mean
coefficient (Train, 2008). λÙ is the sum of the products of each class’s coefficient and proportion
€

in the population. Accordingly, to ascertain whether RC is robustly present in the data, the sign
€

and significance of λÙ is analyzed. The test involves three steps: (1) deriving the number of latent
classes affecting utility; (2) estimating the model given the number of latent classes; and (3)
€

bootstrapping λÙ to ascertain significance.
The test generated the following results across the three scenarios.

When the true

€

causality is RC, λÙ=1997.9 and significantly greater than zero (p=0.001). That λÙ is positive
suggests that RC is robustly present because, on average, agents prefer choices that give them
€

€

more wealth. When the true causality is BT, λÙ = -0.9 and significantly less than zero (p=0.001).
That λÙ is negative suggests that RC is not robustly present because wealth is not a positive
€

predictor of choice, on average. When the true causality is mixed, λÙ=12.9 and significantly
€

23

The term Wijt is used in this estimation because it is unique to each alternative j, whereas Opportunity Costit is a property of a
pair of alternatives.

€
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greater than zero (p < 0.001), suggesting that RC is robustly present. Thus, in contrast to the
prior recommendations, recommendation 3 identifies RC in mixed behavior when rational
behavior is in the minority. This same pattern of results was obtained on a random sample of
14,000 observations across each of the three scenarios, suggesting that the Train model is
suitable for discriminating the presence of RC in smaller samples, a finding already established
by Train (2008), who used a sample of 508.24
4.3.2 Robustness Test of BT Model
In recommendations 1 and 2, when testing for BT with Attainment Discrepancy for historical
aspirations, the assumption was made that estimation of the model should involve the unique
value of the weight coefficient, α, providing the best fit. This assumption is consistent with
current approaches in the literature but is problematic in two respects. First, it does not
simultaneously estimate α with other parameters in the model. Simultaneous estimation is
appropriate if α is endogenous to aspirations, which is stated to be the case within BT (see
equation 3). Second, it does not provide test statistics about whether α contributes meaningfully
to the prediction, which makes it impossible to ascertain whether α is statistically different from
zero or any other values of α. This motivates consideration of how sensitive the support for BT
is to the choice of α. If the true causality in the population is BT, it is expected that the diagnosis
of BT will be robust across more specifications of α. Whereas, if the true causality is RC, or a
mixture of RC and BT, it is expected that less robustness would obtain across values of α.25

24
We did not replicate this test across forty randomly generated subsamples in three scenarios because based on Train’s (2008)
insight, we calculate the computational time to be two years on a single-core machine.
25

So, like Baum, et al. (2005), tests are encouraged for robustness of findings to the choice of α, but suggest this is only one of
two components in the competition for comparative robustness between RC and BT. An unbiased comparative test would
simultaneously compare the robustness of α, and robustness of maximization described in the preceding section.
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The model reported in column 1 of Tables 5-7 was fit for different values of α. Table 9
reports the number of times BT was confirmed across all three scenarios. When the true causality
is RC, it was impossible to simultaneously confirm both types of aspirations. When the true
causality is BT, it was possible to simultaneously confirm both types of aspirations for 12 out of
14 values of α. When the behavior is mixed, simultaneous confirmation of both types of
aspirations obtained for 11 out of 14 values of α. The analysis illustrates that the
recommendation is effective in diagnosing robust support for BT when it is present, while
avoiding robust support for RC when it is not present. An inference for researchers is that the
more robust findings are to variations in α, the more reliable are confirmations of BT.
(Insert Table 9 about here)
To demonstrate that this robustness check is feasible on smaller samples, we replicated
the tests in forty random subsamples of smaller size (n=14,000), constituting 560 attempts for
each scenario (14α x 40) . When the true causality was RC, we never simultaneously confirmed
both types of aspirations. When the true causality was BT, we simultaneously confirmed both
types of aspirations 75.1 percent of the time. In mixed behavior, we simultaneously confirmed
both types of aspirations 64.1 percent of the time. Note that historical aspirations were confirmed
100 percent of the time in pure BT and mixed scenarios. These results suggest that this
robustness check can be reliably performed in samples of 14,000.
4.3.3 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 3
The comparative robustness of confirmations to RC and BT can be examined across the three
scenarios, which should point researchers unambiguously toward the true causality. When the
true causality is RC, the two tests outlined above demonstrate robust confirmation of RC and a
lack of robustness for BT. When the true causality is BT, the tests demonstrate non-robustness of
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RC and robust support for BT. When the true causality is a mixture of RC and BT, the tests
demonstrate confirmation of RC and relatively strong robustness of BT. In each scenario these
comparative tests help to successfully diagnose the true causality present in the data.
Finally, this third recommendation effectively diagnoses true causality. Relative to the
other two recommendations, it is more rigorous in estimating utility, less reliant on specific
operationalizations of theory, and avoids concerns about endogeneity. A limitation is that it does
not involve a statistical test for comparative robustness.
5. Conclusion
It has been nearly fifty years since Cyert and March (1963) considered that organizational
change may be guided not by rational behavior, but by boundedly rational behavior. While their
thesis is decidedly comparative in nature, the empirical research seeking to confirm aspirationlevel decision-making has not been as comparative, which raises concerns about erroneous
confirmations. While comparative tests between behavioral theory and rational choice have not
been implemented in prior research, we use simulated data to demonstrate that it is possible to do
so effectively, and offer a template for how they might be conducted with real (non-simulated)
data. Analysis of simulated data shows that rational decision-makers behave in a statistically
similar manner as predicted in several seminal projects claiming support for behavioral theory.
The simulated agents appear to be satisficing, when they are clearly not. Results are remarkably
robust, and imply that until future work implements comparative testing, support that
organizations change based on aspiration is tenuous. Three recommendations for comparatively
testing behavioral theory and rational choice are shown to be remarkably effective at controlling
Type I and Type II error in simulated data. If implemented together, they overcome the bounds
of any singular test.
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The recommendations for comparative testing are designed to improve empirical
discrimination between behavioral theory and rational choice, but the very process of
implementing them will amplify and clarify the scope of behavioral theory. Comparative testing
may lead to three potential outcomes. First, it may confirm behavioral theory as the dominant
explanation in real data, which will serve to accentuate the credibility of the theory and empirical
approximations of the theory. Second, it may disconfirm behavioral theory as the dominant
explanation in real data. This finding is a signal for researchers to look for theoretical and
empirical causes of disconfirmation, which may result from applying the theory beyond the
original boundary conditions of the theory. For example, since Cyert and March (1963)
developed their theory for large, multi-product firms, where information efficiencies and
political processes are at play, it may be inappropriate to map the theory unaltered onto
entrepreneurial firms. Disconfirmation may also lead scholars to reconsider the original
boundary conditions established by Cyert and March (1963). Finally, disconfirmation may help
deduce imprecise operationalization of theoretical concepts and the relationships they imply, or
inspire research designs better enabling scholars to distinguish aspirations from expectations.
A third possible outcome from implementing the recommendations could simultaneously
confirm some in the population satisfice while others maximize. While the non-nested test
developed by Vuong (1989) explicitly allows for theoretical overlap in samples, it only allows
one to discern whether one theory better explains the data, and not the extent to which each
explains the data. Finite mixture models have been recently developed to tackle this issue. They
“estimate the parameters of each theory while simultaneously estimating the probability that each
theory applies to the sample” (Harrison and Rutström, 2009: 133). A challenge with mixture
models of this kind is that convergence may not occur in maximum likelihood estimations
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(Harrison and Rutström, 2009: 137), as was the case with the data simulated for this paper.
Nevertheless, such problems are being actively addressed in econometrics of choice, suggesting
an interesting opportunity is eminent. Transparent attempts at comparative testing in mixed data
will strengthen the support of behavioral theory.
Some may criticize this study’s replication of prior empirical work as mere manipulation
of data and initial conditions. This critique is impotent for several reasons. First, the replications
are robust across a wide range of specifications. While these replications are not “globally”
robust because the considered range does not reflect the universe of potential specifications, they
are “locally” robust. It is infeasible to show global robustness because the potential set of initial
parameters is unbounded. Moreover, doing so would suggest that behavioral theory reduces to
rational choice, which is certainly not the intent of this paper. Moreover, the fact that
recommendations effectively discriminate between behavioral theory and rational choice should
exhibit evidence that the replications are not a product of initial specifications.
Others may criticize as unrealistic the characterization of pure satisficing or maximizing
behavior, instead preferring some hybrid representation. As demonstrated, however, these pure
scenarios are necessary for distinguishing between Type I and Type II error. Some may prefer
comparatively testing behavioral theory against a rational choice that is instrumented with
Simon’s objective rationality, incorporating game-theoretic reasoning. Since agents would not
rely as heavily on prior performance as they do in our model of subjective rationality, such an
approach may make it more difficult to replicate empirical confirmations of behavioral theory,
which may be important to those fastening affections to behavioral theory. Comparative tests
between the theories should focus on the maximizing and satisficing heuristics, not on
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assumptions about knowledge that are merely used to instrument both theories. Indeed, it is
advisable to adopt the most general interpretation of a theory, not a more strict interpretation.
The striking similarity observed between aspirations and expectations should not be
interpreted as a condemnation of behavioral theory or satisficing behavior. Clearly,
organizational aspirations are important. Rather, this study is a call for greater insight into when
aspirations are important and when they are not. One could take issue with the targeted attack on
empirical work around aspirations, claiming that empirical work around rational choice suffers
equal limitations. Clearly the principles of comparative testing apply equally to both theories.
The readers of this journal, however, tend to be predominantly organizational. Moreover, the
recommendations do not favor either behavioral theory or rational choice. The use of three
scenarios demonstrates agnosticism about true causality.
One limitation is that behavioral theory and rational choice are analyzed as the only
alternatives predicting change. Other explanations are plausible, and in the presence of a third
unobserved theory, comparatively testing two theories is not sufficient for diagnosing causality.
Recall the purpose was not to comparatively test in real data, but demonstrate the consequences
of failing to do so and offer reliable solutions for comparative testing. This purpose is most
effectively accomplished by focusing on a single theory and its most likely alternative.
The explicit focus on behavioral theory must not blind scholars who are studying
organizational change and who have other affections. Affections can endanger research by
straining the integrity of the intellectual process. Comparative testing is needed to discipline all
inquiry of organizational phenomena. Of course, the rigor with which one implements
comparative testing is the ultimate discipline.
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Appendix A: Utility Functions Assumed in Section 3.1

Risk attitude (m)

Utility Function (U)

Type of risk attitude

1

U(W) = e0.60W-1

risk-seeking

2

U(W) = e0.50W-1

risk-seeking

3

U(W) = -e-1.00W+1

risk-averse

4

U(W) = -e-1.05W+1

risk-averse

5

U(W) = -e-1.10W +1

risk-averse
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Appendix B: Description of the Simulation of Change Under Satisficing Behavior
Like in Greve (2002), change is simulated through satisficing behavior, but this simulation is
altered to make the behavior entirely consistent with the benchmark model of Greve (1998), who
specifies a decision heuristic in hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, listed below.26
Hypothesis la (2a): When performance relative to the social (historical) aspiration level
increases, the probability of change decreases.
Hypothesis lb (2b): The decrease in the probability of change is greater for performance
increases above the social (historical) aspiration level.
In accord with BT, change behavior is simulated in the following way:
1. Historical aspirations in the first period (Ai1) are randomly drawn from U (0, 0.25).
2. Groups are determined to be reference groups for social aspirations.
3. Beginning period 2, agents calculate attainment discrepancies for historical (Iit-1-Ait-1) and
social aspirations (Iit-1-Bit-1).
4. In the first period, choice of strategy is random to generate the first record of
performance.
5. In subsequent periods, probability of change qit for each agent is determined the
following logistic function:

log

qit
= ω0 + ω1 [ I it −1 − Ait −1 ]>0 + ω2 [ I it −1 − Ait −1 ]<0 + ω3 [ I it −1 − Bit −1 ]>0 + ω4 [ I it −1 − Bit −1 ]<0 + ω5 N it −1
1 − qit
where coefficients ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 are arbitrarily assigned values -10, -5, -8, -4,
respectively, consistent with Greve’s (1998) prediction that the probability of change is
more negative when performance is above aspirations than below; coefficient ω5 is
arbitrarily assigned a value of 20, consistent with Greve’s (1998) expectation that it
should be positive; and intercept ω0 is assigned a negative value, as found in Greve’s
(1998) model.

6. qÙit is then used to predict change (Yit), a value of zero or one, through the Bernoulli
distribution.
7. If Yit=1, agents randomly move to one of the four remaining strategies (Greve, 2002).
€

All parameters not mentioned above are unchanged from section 3.1. 200 runs result in 600,000
observations. Note that the simulation is entirely consistent with Cyert and March (1963).

26
Greve (1998) uses the negative inconsistency parameter to resolve the ambiguity when performance lies between social and
historical aspirations, while Greve (2002) resolves the ambiguity by assigning importance weights to historical and social
aspirations.
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Appendix C: Description of the Simulation of Change Under Mixed Behavior
Change is simulated through a mixture of satisficing and maximizing behaviors. There are
infinite ways to mix behavior. For this sample, mixture is established in the following way:
1. Agents are randomly assigned to five groups.
2. Agents in groups 3-5 behave in accord with Appendix B.
3. Agents in group 1 have the same utility function as specified for risk attitude m=3, and
behave in accord with section 3.1.
4. Agents in group 2 have the same utility function as specified for risk attitude m=5, and
behave in accord with section 3.1.
All parameters not mentioned above remain unchanged from section 3.1. 200 runs result in
600,000 observations, approximately 60 percent of which represent satisficing behavior and 40
percent represent maximizing behavior. Note that the simulation is entirely consistent with both
BT and RC for separate parts of the sample. Recognize the simulation does not just merge data
sets generated separately by maximizers and satisficers. They act simultaneously in the same
setting, resulting in interactions between agents with different heuristics. One subtlety of this
mixed behavior is that because agents in groups 3-5 randomly choose strategies if dissatisfied,
the landscape is more effectively revealed to maximizing agents, who otherwise would not have
recognized superior alternative that were unexplored.
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Table 1. Representation of a History for a Single Agent from a Run for All 30 periods27
Period
(t)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

27

Wealth at the
beginning of
the period
(Wit-1)
0.0000000
0.1282474
0.1170309
0.1170295
0.2243357
0.2775171
0.2398448
0.2760066
0.3917541
0.3842933
0.4086289
0.4169403
0.3978081
0.4792343
0.5640773
0.5901301
0.6458557
0.7339408
0.7625536
0.8038235
0.8913667
0.8777467
0.9148593
0.8934351
0.903338
0.9760581
1.004296
1.017782
1.116383
1.111112

Past
strategy
(jt-1*)

Costs of
switching
(S)

4
2
5
1
2
1
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
4
2
2
2

0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996
0.0022996

Expected utility (E[Uijt])
j=1

j=2

j=3

j=4

j=5

0.20705
01
0.19765
6
0.19765
49
0.28487
83
0.35263
02
0.25693
1
0.28288
7
0.36495
33
0.34810
12
0.36454
78
0.37006
92
0.35728
67
0.40995
36
0.46024
46
0.47480
97
0.50465
79
0.54841
69
0.56178
22
0.58036
61
0.61721
93
0.61170
58
0.62654
6
0.61804
97
0.62200
07
0.64978
89
0.66002
01
0.66480
03
0.69776
79
0.69609
06

0.31545
11
0.16454
84
0.19268
72
0.29133
68
0.31332
01
0.28388
65
0.31056
75
0.39309
66
0.38092
88
0.39163
74
0.39339
46
0.37244
14
0.42247
36
0.47169
75
0.48595
36
0.51516
84
0.55799
89
0.57108
07
0.58927
02
0.62534
14
0.62097
01
0.63881
19
0.62595
06
0.62856
66
0.65889
34
0.67057
22
0.67490
51
0.70807
28
0.70561
99

0.14657
29
0.13646
24
0.13646
12
0.22847
64
0.27037
78
0.24093
85
0.26921
97
0.35285
01
0.34776
05
0.36421
56
0.36973
99
0.35695
08
0.40964
51
0.45996
25
0.47453
52
0.50439
89
0.54818
08
0.56155
32
0.58014
68
0.61701
92
0.61150
29
0.62635
08
0.61785
01
0.62180
31
0.64960
58
0.65984
23
0.66462
52
0.69760
99
0.69593
18

0.20896
24
0.19765
6
0.19765
49
0.28314
95
0.32208
17
0.29472
85
0.28029
8
0.36111
98
0.35609
53
0.37234
01
0.39018
32
0.38698
84
0.44388
61
0.49350
15
0.50046
69
0.52476
13
0.56891

0.26324
16
0.25451
32
0.16580
45
0.25289
12
0.29346
66
0.26495
89
0.29234
52
0.36106
78
0.35604
28
0.36384
12
0.36936
88
0.35657
2
0.40929
74
0.45964
44
0.47422
57
0.50410
71
0.54791
47
0.56129
49
0.57989
95
0.61679
36
0.61127
41
0.62613
06
0.61762
5
0.62158
04
0.64939
94
0.65964
2
0.66442
76
0.69743
18
0.69575
27

A sample agent with m=4.

42

0.57918
73
0.59520
43
0.63222
77
0.62295
61
0.63660
99
0.62744
41
0.63171
74
0.65956
74
0.66911
37
0.67297
75
0.70514
08
0.70350
44

Chosen
strategy
(jt*)
4
2
5
1
2
1
4
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
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Table 2. Estimating the Determinants of Aspirations: A Comparison of Lant and Montgomery
(1987), Lant (1992), and Mezias et al. (2002) with Replications on the Data Where True Causality is
RC28
Hypothesized
Relationships
in the
Benchmark
Studies

Lant and
Montgomery
(1987) & Lant
(1992)29

+

1
+*
+ **

Replication of
(1) on
simulated data
where true
causality is
30
RC
2
+ ***
+ ***

+

+ **

+ ***

	
  
Constant
Historical Aspiration ( Ait-1)
Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)
Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)
R2
F-statistic
Hausman test for random
effects
F-test for addition of
attainment discrepancy social
Number of observations

0.839

	
  

0.888

+ ***

- **

- ***

	
  

	
  
271.72**

+ ***

Mezias et. al
31
(2002)

-

Adjusted R2

3
+ ***

Replication of
(3) on
simulated data
where true
causality is
RC
4
+ ***
+ ***

	
  
0.976

2,141,315***

	
  

0.512

	
  

	
  

	
  

n.a.

8554.740***

	
  

	
  

*

***

860

135,000

105

540,000

* p < 0.05;
** p<0.01;
***p <0.001

28

Only the direction of the relationships is indicated in the table, since the referred studies do not standardize coefficients.

29
From Table 2 of Lant and Montgomery (1987) and Table 2 of Lant (1992). Lant (1992) estimated the generalized linear models
with the Corchrane and Orcutt (1949) transformation. Because the signs of corresponding coefficients are the same across
industries considered in her study, we report results only for Industry 1.
30

Because the Corchrane and Orcutt (1949) transformation dictates omission of the first observation in each series and social
aspirations can only be derived starting with t=2, only observations starting with t=3 were used, resulting in 540,000 observations
in this model.
31

From Table 3 of Mezias et al. (2002). They estimated the Fuller and Battese (1974) variance component models with two
alternative proxies for Attainment Discrepancy for Social Aspiration, which they name Social Comparison. Due to the fact that
the signs of the coefficients are the same, we report results only for their Model 4. Unfortunately, SAS does not estimate the
TSCSREG procedure when sample sizes are large, which is the case with the simulated data. Therefore, sample histories of
randomly selected 5,000 agents in periods 2-30 were used for analysis.
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Table 3. Estimating Organizational Change: A Comparison of Greve (1998) with Replication on
the Data Where True Causality is RC
Model
Replication of (1)
on simulated data
Greve (1998)
where true
Pooled logit
33
causality is RC
1
2
-2.085
-1.049*

Hypothesized
Relationships
in the benchmark
32
study
Constant
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for Historical
Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for Social
Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for Social
Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1)
Log Likelihood
Number of observations

__
_
__
_

-0.168*

-11.211*

-0.054*

-9.971*

-0.187*

-0.968*

-0.048*
0.020
-5,832.65*
16,294

-0.785*
20.595*
-316,981.24*
560,000

	
  
*p <0.001

32

	
  

	
  

	
  

Model 5 in Greve (1998, Table 2) is used as a benchmark for comparison.

33

560,000 observations are used for analysis because strategies were assigned in period 1 and the derivation of social aspirations
(described in section 3.2) is allowable after period 2.
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Table 4. Type I and Type II Errors When Scenarios are Pure Maximizing, Pure
Satisficing, or Mixed Behavior

	
  
	
  
Type I error
(false positive)

Type II error
(false negative)

True Causality
Maximizing

Satisficing

A

C

Confirm BT when it
is not true

Confirm RC when it
is not true

B

D

E

Reject RC when it is
true

Reject BT when it is
true

Reject BT and/or RC
when they are true

45
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Table 5. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is RC
Model

Pooled logit

Constant
Opportunity Cost
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1)
Log Likelihood

Random-effects logit

1

2

3

4

5

-1.049**

-1.018**

-1.029**

-1.263**

-1.264**

19.447**

19.837**

-11.211**

-15.555**

-10.244**

-16.087**

-9.971**

-12.553**

-13.756**

-17.499**

-0.968**

1.090**

0.529*

3.113**

-0.785**

3.482**

-1.041**

4.498**

20.595**

12.078**

28.225**

18.056**

-291,920**

-308,671**

-278,882**

-316,981**

-305,593**

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ

27,346.90**

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 2, χ

50,123.24**

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 4, χ

Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective
2
pooled model, χ
Number of observations

25.014**

	
  

	
  

	
  

560,000

560,000

	
  
560,000

Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error
(false positive) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error
(false positive) for BT
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error
(false negative) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error
(false negative) for BT

	
  
59,578.84**
17,000**

26,000**

560,000

560,000

n.a.

n.a.

partially
effective
completely
effective

completely
effective
completely
effective

n.a.

n.a.

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001
n.a. = not applicable
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Table 6. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is BT
Model
Pooled logit
Constant

1

2

3

4

5

-0.934*

-0.678*

-0.942*

-0.934*

-0.942*

-0.007

0.011

Dummy Opportunity Cost
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1)
Log Likelihood

0.011

-8.982*

-8.982*

-8.985*

-8.986*

-4.900*

-4.900*

-4.902*

-4.901*

-5.849*

-5.848*

-5.849*

-5.849*

-4.111*

-4.111*

-4.112*

-4.112*

16.482*

16.482*

-253,292*

-358,151

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ

	
  

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 4, χ

	
  

	
  

Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective pooled
2
model, χ

	
  

	
  

Number of observations

Random-effects logit

16.487*

-253,291*

-253,291*
	
  

1.85

560,000

	
  

	
  

1.85
0.52

560,000

Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false
positive) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false
positive) for BT
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false
negative) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false
negative) for BT

*p < 0.001;
n.a. = not applicable
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560,000

-253,290*

560,000

0.55
560,000

completely
effective

completely
effective

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

completely
effective

completely
effective
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Table 7. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is Mixed Behavior
Model
Pooled logit
Constant

1

2

3

4

5

-0.107*

-0.117*

-0.100*

-0.439*

-0.432*

-0.000

-0.010

Dummy Opportunity Cost
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1)
Log Likelihood

-0.009

-7.059*

-7.059*

-6.554*

-6.554*

-3.026*

-3.025*

-4.909*

-4.909*

-3.165*

-3.165*

-2.419*

-2.419*

-2.462*

-2.462*

-3.664*

-3.664*

9.560*

9.561*

12.079*

12.080*

-307,279*

-288,489*

-288,489*

-307,280*

-387,195

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ

	
  

2
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 6, χ

	
  

	
  

Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective pooled
2
model, χ

	
  

	
  

Number of observations

Random-effects logit

	
  

1.62

560,000

	
  

560,000

Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false
positive) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false
positive) for BT
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false
negative) for RC
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false
negative) for BT

* p < 0.001;
n.a. = not applicable
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560,000

1.21
38,000*

38,000*

560,000

560,000

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

ineffective

ineffective

completely
effective

partially
effective

Table 8. Non-nested Test of Alternative Hypotheses34
True
Causality
RC

BT

Mixed

Null Hypothesis

Vuong's (1989) Test
z-statistic
z-statistic
corrected35

Effectiveness in Eliminating
Type I Error
for RC
n.a.

Type I Error
for BT
n.a.
completely
effective
n.a.

Type II
Error for RC
completely
effective
n.a.

Type II
Error for BT
n.a.

n.a.

completely
effective
n.a.

RC is not better than BT

34.249*

101.856*

BT is not better than RC

-34.249

-101.856

n.a.

BT is not better than RC36

296.371*

240.383*

n.a.

RC is not better than BT36

-296.371

-240.383

n.a.

n.a.

BT is not better than RC 36

249.542*

187.685*

completely
effective
n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

RC is not better than BT36

- 249.542

-187.685

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

completely
effective
n.a.

*p < 0.001;
n.a. = not applicable

34

Because the true causality is not known ex ante in an empirical setting, two null hypotheses were tested for each of the three scenarios. The two tests performed on the same data
generate statistics of the same absolute value but opposite signs and have p-values, summing to one. While testing both null hypotheses is redundant in the case of known causality,
this step is exercised in the paper to illustrate its empirical implementation. Based on the p-values, one of the following 3 outcomes may potentially obtain: (1) neither of the
theories is diagnosed to be better than another; (2) BT is diagnosed to be better than RC; or (3) RC is diagnosed to be better than BT.
35

The Schwartz (1978) correction is used.

36

The non-nested test in these instances is not required, because, in each of those cases, one of the compared models is insignificant (Models 2 in Tables 5, 6, and 7). However,
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True Causality

Table 9. Robustness of Support to BT to the Value of α under Alternative Scenarios37

# of Tested
Values of α

# of Complete
Confirmations of
BT

Proportion of
Complete
Confirmations of
BT

# of
Confirmations of
the Effects of
Social
Aspirations

Proportion of
Confirmations of
the Effects of
Social
Aspirations

# of
Confirmations of
the Effects of
Historical
Aspirations

Proportion of
Confirmations of
the Effects of
Historical
Aspirations

RC

14

0

0.000

8

0.571

6

0.429

BT

14

12

0.857

12

0.857

14

1.000

Mixed

14

11

0.785

12

0.857

13

0.929

37
Robustness of α is investigated in in the range of [0,0.7] with a step of 0.05. A confirmation to BT is considered complete, if all of the specific predictions on the effects of
aspirations on change (Hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed. A confirmation of the effects of Social Aspirations obtains, if the predictions on the
effects of social aspirations on change (Hypotheses 1A and 1B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed. A confirmation of the effects of Historical Aspirations obtains, if the
predictions on the effects of historical aspirations on change (Hypotheses 2A and 2B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed.
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Table 10. Summary of Effectiveness of Recommendations
Effective at Eliminating
Type I Error when Agents

Tested Theory

Satisfice
RC
BT

Type II Error when Agents

Maximize
RC
BT

Mixed
RC
BT

Satisfice
RC
BT

Maximize
RC
BT

Mixed
RC
BT
✔

Recommendation 1: Deliberate Control for
Maximizing or Satisficing

✔

n.a.

n.a.

✔

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

✔

✔

n.a.

Recommendation 2: Test of Non-Nested
Alternative Hypotheses

✔

n.a.

n.a.

✔

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

✔

✔

n.a.

✔

✔

Recommendation 3: Comparative
Robustness of Alternative Theories

✔

n.a.

n.a.

✔

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

✔

✔

n.a.

✔

✔

n.a. = not applicable; ✔ denotes instances where recommendations are effective at eliminating errors in tests for the presence of the theory.
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